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RESPONSE
RESPONSE TO: "PAY-TO-PLAY: THE
IMPACT OF GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS ON DRUG
SHORTAGES"
CURTIS ROONEY*
The Note authored by Christian DeRoo in Vol. 3.1 of the American
University Business Law Review' fails to cite important and persuasive
legal precedent related to the subject matter. For example, the U.S. 8th
Circuit Court of Appeals in Southeast Missouri Hospital v. C.R. Bard, Inc.
summarily dismissed the argument that GPO compensation through vendor
payments gives incentive to hospitals and GPOs to overpay for medical
devices to the detriment of Medicare and Medicaid, forcing competitors out
of the market.2 In fact, in the previous hearing by the 8th Circuit, the court
described one of the expert reports in this case (authored by the same
experts that DeRoo cites) as "fatally flawed". A similar report by two of
the same authors was also rejected as "unbelievable" by practitioners in the
field, including the Mayo Clinic, New York-Presbyterian, BJC Healthcare,
Memorial Hermann, and other large hospitals.4
Mr. DeRoo argues that "many of the agreements entered into between
GPOs and pharmaceutical manufacturers amount to exclusionary
* Curtis Rooney is President of the Healthcare Supply Chain Association (HSCA), the
leading organization that advocates on behalf of healthcare group purchasing
organizations (GPOs) in Washington, D.C.
1. Christian DeRoo, Pay-to-Play: The Impact of Group Purchasing
Organizations on Drug Shortages, 3 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 227 (2014).
2. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 616-17 (8th Cir. 2011).
3. Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 616 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2010), vacated,
reh'g granted, 642 F.3d 608 (2011).
4. Letter from fourteen of the nation's largest hospitals (including Mayo Clinic,
New York-Presbyterian Hosp., Mem'l Hermann, et al.) to Eamonn P. Hobbs, Chairman
of the Board, Med. Device Mfr. Ass'n (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
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agreements, either explicitly through contractual arrangements, or
implicitly through arrangements between the GPO and member
hospitals." 5 Unfortunately, he fails to mention that the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey recently rejected this argument
when an antitrust plaintiff challenged "loyalty-discount" contracts.6 The
Court held that such contracts are not anticompetitive, as a matter of law, as
long as the prices they offer are above-cost.7
Eisai and its expert witnesses (Einer Elhauge and Nicholas Economides)
argued, inter alia, that Sanofi's contracts prevented customers from buying
less expensive rival products, raised rivals' costs, and imposed "disloyalty
penalties" on customers who failed to satisfy Sanofi's purchase
8
requirements. The court rejected these arguments.9 Contrary to Eisai's
allegations, the evidence showed that customers can and did buy from
Sanofi's rivals, and nothing in Sanofi's contracts prevented them from
doing so, other than a low price.'0 The contention that Sanofi's practices
raised rivals' costs was, the court found, nothing more than another
observation about the effects of Sanofi's pricing." The court noted that
Eisai's argument that Sanofi's prices were not really discounts, but rather
"disloyalty penalties," was "a matter of semantics."l 2 (Op. at 65.)
The argument put forward here is that GPOs "create decreased
pharmaceutical manufacturer diversity and a fragile supply chain" and
therefore, a drug shortage.1 3 Aside from the fact that GPOs existed long
before the current drug shortage, these identical arguments have already
been put forward by Phillip Zweig, Executive Director, Physicians Against
Drug Shortages, a long-time paid consultant for the medical device
industry.14 Mr. Zweig has argued that GPOs inflate the cost of medical
prices and used reports by Robert Litan and Hal Singer to support his
5. DeRoo, supra note 1, at 232-33.
6. See Eisai, Inc. v. Sanoft-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2014 WL
1343254 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014).
7. Id. at *30.
8. Id. at *26.
9. Id. at *29.
10. Id. at *26.
12. Id. at *27-28.
12. Id. at *28.
13. DeRoo, supra note 1, at 227.
14. Patricia Earl & Phillip L. Zweig, Connecting the Dots: How Anticompetitive
Contracting Practices, Kickbacks, and Self-dealing by Hospital Group Purchasing
Organizations (GPOs) Caused the U.S. Drug Shortage, PHYSICIANS AGAINST DRUG
SHORTAGES 2-4 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www. http://nebula.wsimg.com/
clOf39efefbebd4f6475c3c89Oe98b8b?AccessKeyld=62BC662C928CO6F7384C&dispo
sition=0&alloworigin=1.
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statements.' 5 Unfortunately, for both Mr. Zweig and Mr. DeRoo, it is
impossible to argue that GPOs drive out competition in the generic
pharmaceutical market while citing reports that say GPOs inflate health
care costs in the medical device market. One must choose a side and stick
with it. Fortunately, the General Accountability Office (GAO) and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently reaffirmed that the root
causes of drug shortages are manufacturing problems, quality issues and
barriers to getting new suppliers on line when supply is disrupted.' 6 Drug
shortages are a complex challenge with no overnight fix. In summary, the
courts are likely to continue to summarily dismiss specious arguments like
the one's Mr. DeRoo promotes.17 In the meantime, GPOs will continue
their commitment to being a part of the solution.
15. Id. at 3.
16. United States Government Accountability Office, Drug Shortages: Public
Health Threat Continues, Despite Efforts to Help Ensure Product Availability,
GAO.Gov 21-24 ( Feb. 2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660785.pdf.
17. See generally DeRoo, supra note 1.
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